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THE SEVENTH LETTER
A Discussion of Myles Burnyeat and Michael
Frede, The Pseudo-Platonic Seventh Letter
NICHOLAS DENYER
M manuscripts contain over twenty letters purportedly
written by Plato. Thirteen of these letters form the fourth and last
element in the ninth and last of the Tetralogies in the canon of
Plato’s works that was compiled by Thrasyllus, court astrologer to
the Emperor Tiberius. Of these thirteen letters, by far the most
substantial is the one that Thrasyllus placed seventh. It is equal in
length to all the other twelve put together: that is to say, it is about
the size of the Charmides, or of a typical tragedy.
The Seventh Letter has an interest out of all proportion to its
size. For it is unique among the purportedly Platonic letters in be-
ing often taken for genuine Plato; and if it is genuine, it gives us
two things that we can get from none of Plato’s dialogues. In the
ﬁrst place, the dialogues give us only the scrappiest of facts about
Plato’s life: he was present when Socrates was tried, oﬀering to pay
a ﬁne on his behalf (Ap.   ;   –), but absent through illness
when Socrates was executed (Phaedo   ). The Seventh Letter,
by contrast, contains an ample narrative of Plato’s political life from
his coming of age in the late ﬁfth century down almost to the time of
his death in the middle of the fourth, and focused on his misadven-
tures over the years in Syracuse. In the second place, the dialogues
do not contain a single passage, not even a short one, where Plato
speaks, in his own voice, to tell us of his philosophical beliefs. They
leave us in a curious position: we have quite as much information
about what philosophical thoughts Plato entertained as we have for
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more or less any philosophical thinker in history; when, however,
we ask which thoughts Plato not merely entertained, but positively
accepted, we are reduced to conjecture, whether crude (for instance,
that Plato believed the thoughts that he put into the mouths of
the heroes of his dialogues) or subtle (for instance, that Plato be-
lieved the thoughts to which we are forced when we do justice to
all the thoughts that he puts into the mouths of all his characters).
The Seventh Letter, by contrast, avows many beliefs about poli-
tical theory, metaphysics, language, and epistemology. Moreover,
the Seventh Letter might also, if genuine, help us with our ascrip-
tions to Plato of beliefs which it does not directly avow. For ex-
ample, if the beliefs that it does avow are all put into the mouth of
Socrates, then we might infer that Plato also believed whatever else
he put into the mouth of Socrates. Perhaps such information about
the beliefs and political activities of Plato is only a higher form of
gossip, something that should be of no great interest to us as austere
philosophers. But accurate gossip about the philosophical great is
bound to interest us as human beings, and as historians of philo-
sophy; moreover, even the austerest philosopher should be inter-
ested in the relations between philosophical thoughts entertained,
beliefs accepted, and political actions undertaken.
And what if the Seventh Letter is not genuine? A lot will then de-
pend on the intentions, capacities, and opportunities of its author.
At one extreme, people sometimes suppose that the author was a
close follower of Plato, well informed about the master’s beliefs and
activities, who at least meant his letter to have the plausibility of a
properly researched historical novel, and who perhaps even hoped
to get his letter accepted as genuine by people who were equally
well informed. On this supposition, the Seventh Letter would be
almost as useful a source as it would if genuine. At any rate, when it
says something that was once readily checkable, it will even now be
readily credible. And if—as might be expected—the readily check-
able concerned Plato’s political activities more than his philosophi-
cal beliefs, Plato’s political activities are where we particularly feel
the want of information from the man himself. At the other ex-
treme, we might suppose that the author of the Seventh Letter has
as little connection to Plato as the authors of the letters of Socra-
tes, Heraclitus, and Diogenes have to those other philosophers. In
 These, and many other such collections of letters, are to be found in R. Hercher,
Epistolographi Graeci (Paris, ).
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that case, we should no more think of deriving information about
Plato from the Seventh Letter than we think of deriving informa-
tion about, for example, Epicurus’ senile pursuit of the courtesan
Leontion from her letter about it to Lamia (Alciphron, Ep. . ).
The authenticity of the Seventh Letter was the subject of a series
of Oxford seminars in Michaelmas Term , which eventually
resulted in this book. Michael Frede and Myles Burnyeat led the
original seminars.
Burnyeat is still with us, and was able to polish his contribution
to the seminars into the form in which it is presented here. Frede
died in , leaving one version of his thoughts on the Seventh
Letter in a polished essay, here reprinted. But his contribution to
the seminars had to be reconstructed from the detailed manuscript
notes of his own from which he spoke, occasionally supplemented
by the recollections and notes of three scholars who attended the se-
minars: Lesley Brown, Tobias Reinhardt, and Christopher Taylor.
Dominic Scott did this reconstruction, turning Frede’s notes into
continuous prose. Scott describes the process of reconstruction in
an ‘Editor’s Introduction’ and an ‘Editor’s Guide’, and gives a vivid
sense of what it required by reproducing in facsimile a few pages of
Frede’s manuscript. In collaboration with Carol Atack, Scott also
equipped Frede’s contribution with a scholarly apparatus of end-
notes, which amplify some of Frede’s references, comment on some
editorial diﬃculties, and the like. This gives the Frede section of the
book a strangely inconsistent character. On the one hand, Frede’s
manuscript is treated as something of an object of scholarly study
in its own right. Thus Frede’s own redundant and repetitive check-
list of putatively Platonic epistles is faithfully reproduced on p. ,
instead of being silently set straight; and while any resolute copy
editor of a living author would simply insert parenthetical English
translations where house style forbids the quotation of untrans-
lated Greek, every Greek word that Frede quotes is translated in
the endnotes. The spirit here seems that in which we do not prune
Shakespeare’s redundancies, or promote our glosses on his words
from margin to text: it is as if the editor is presenting a source for
future historians of scholarship. On the other hand, Frede’s manu-
script is also used as raw material for a work addressed to those
interested not so much in Frede as in the Seventh Letter. Thus the
manuscript’s elaboratemarking of sections and subsections with ro-
man and arabic numerals, and Greek and Latin letters, is almost
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entirely removed. The spirit here seems that in which, on serving
the roasted joint, we remove the string that trussed it when raw.
But we can hardly blame Scott for giving the Frede section of the
book a character so strangely inconsistent. For what else could Scott
have done? Provide what the palaeographers call a diplomatic tran-
script of Frede’smanuscript? Promote himself to Frede’s co-author,
and treat Frede’s notes as ruthlessly as one treats one’s own rough
drafts?
The original plan for the seminars was that Frede would attack,
and Burnyeat defend, the authenticity of the Seventh Letter. But
as Burnyeat prepared for the seminars, he came to think that this
would mean defending the indefensible (p. ix). The upshot is that
the book contains two attacks on the authenticity of the Seventh
Letter.
Before Frede and Burnyeat present their attacks, Frede argues in
detail that the Seventh Letter is, if not quite guilty by association,
at the very least highly suspect because of the company it keeps.
Almost all philosophical letters that purport to be earlier than Epi-
curus’ are bogus. Indeed almost every collection of such letters is
entirely bogus. In most cases, that would be agreed without argu-
ment. Frede provides a compelling argument that it applies also to
the correspondence of Speusippuswith Philip ofMacedon. So if the
Seventh Letter is genuine, it is a freak. The point is not simply that
the Seventh Letter would be the ﬁrst authentic philosophical letter;
for after all, given that there are now and have not always been such
letters, there must have been a ﬁrst. The point is rather that there
would be no second such letter for a long time afterwards.We there-
fore need a strong argument if we are to accept the Seventh Letter
as authentic. And we lack what would be the strongest kind of ar-
gument: someone close in time to Plato who mentions the Seventh
Letter and says it is by Plato. Indeed, there is not this kind of ar-
gument for the authenticity of any other of the supposedly Platonic
letters; and for some of them—notoriously the Twelfth—there is
actual argument against authenticity. Of course, such reasons for
suspecting the Seventh Letter are precisely that and only that: rea-
sons for suspecting it. Nor does Frede claim otherwise.
As for positive arguments against authenticity, Burnyeat has two,
and so does Frede.
Burnyeat’s ﬁrst argument is that by speaking about malign de-
ities at   – and   –  the author of the Seventh Letter
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reveals a commitment to a radically un-Platonic theology. The diﬃ-
culty with this argument is that even if maleﬁcent deities are denied
by Socrates at Rep.   –, they are not clearly aﬃrmed in the
Seventh Letter; and the cagey formulations of the Seventh Letter
are not out of keeping with what the Stranger says in the Laws.
Compare   – ‘it might have been chance, but the appearance
is that one among the superior powers was even then contriving’
(ἴσως μὲν κατὰ τύχην, ἔοικεν μὴν τότε μηχανωμένῳ τινὶ τῶν κρειττό-
νων) and   – ‘presumably a sort of supernatural being or a
sort of vengeful spirit’ (ἤ πού τις δαίμων ἤ τις ἀλιτήριος) with Laws
  – ‘some bad thing that is neither human nor divine . . . a
sort of sting, innate in the human race from ancient and unexpiated
wrongs, that goes about in vengefulness’ (οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον . . . κακὸν
οὐδὲ θεῖον . . . οἶστρος δέ . . . τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ἀλιτηριώδης).
Burnyeat’s second argument is that the author of the Seventh
Letter is a philosophical incompetent: nobody with the philoso-
phical capacity of Plato, or of a pupil of Plato, or even of a phi-
losophical critic of Plato, would think to move, as the Seventh Let-
ter does at   –  , from the premiss that words get their
meaning by convention to the conclusion that words can give only
an inadequate representation of the essence of a thing. One counter
to this second argument would be that the philosophical incompe-
tence of the author of the Seventh Letter cannot be all that gross,
given that Burnyeat did not discern it until preparing for his se-
minars with Frede. Another counter would be that even compe-
tent philosophers sometimes produce strangely gappy inferences;
for is not detecting and ﬁlling such gaps a main task for historians
of philosophy?
Frede’s ﬁrst argument is that if Plato wrote the Seventh Letter,
he would have written it when he was writing the Laws, and thus,
at the very least, taking very seriously, as worthy of ample develop-
ment, the idea that the rule of law is an acceptable second best to
rule by a philosopher king. Yet that attitude to that idea cannot be
squared with what the Seventh Letter says when it borrows from
the Republic to maintain that only the prospect of establishing ideal
rule by a philosopher king can license any intervention in politics.
This argument is hard to counter. It requires no contentious iden-
tiﬁcation of a view of one of Plato’s characters with a view of Plato’s
own; and its assumption about the date of the Laws is, in the light
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of Arist. Pol. b–, as certain as anything else, and far more
certain than most things, in the dating of Plato’s dialogues.
Frede’s second argument is that Plato could not possibly have
been so foolish as to think that Dion was, and that Hipparinus and
the youngerDionysius had the capacity to become, a philosopher ﬁt
to be king. This argument is more problematic than Frede’s ﬁrst.
For consider what would be the purpose of the Seventh Letter if
its author is not Plato. The Letter could be interpreted as some-
thing of an apologia, a sympathetic narrative of key events in Plato’s
life, devised by some supporter or admirer with a view to giving
those events as good a gloss as possible. In that case, the key events
presented here—Plato’s visits to Sicily, his failure to achieve any-
thing worthwhile in the tangle that was Syracusan politics—must
have been notorious among those for whom the apologia wasmeant.
Finer details of those events, and of Plato’s motives for his part in
them, would no doubt have been matters for debate or speculation
or apologia. But the apologia would be motiveless unless the story
that it tells is true in its broad outlines. This would mean that Plato,
on coming to engage in practical politics, was guilty of some gro-
tesquely foolishmisjudgements. And someone foolish enough to get
caught up in Syracusan politics, as Plato must have done if the apo-
logia interpretation is correct, is certainly foolish enough to hope
that in Dion he has found a philosopher king.
But what if the apologia interpretation is not correct? The largest
part of Burnyeat’s contribution to this volume is an argument that
while the Seventh Letter may contain apologetic elements, it is
not in fact an apologia at all, but something more like a tragedy: a
tragedy in prose. To quote Burnyeat’s own formulation from p. :
‘The idea of a tragedy in prose is Plato’s invention (Laws b).My
suggestion is that our author borrowed the idea tomake a tragedy in
epistolary form out of Plato’s own life.’ This conceit is somewhat
strained. When Laws   – mentions prose tragedy, the con-
text is what we should say to tragic poets who seek admission to our
new city: ‘We ourselves are poets, so far as in us lies, of a tragedy
that is most ﬁne and most good. For we have ordered our entire
constitution as a representation of the most ﬁne and most good life;
and this ordering is pronounced, at least by us, to be, in reality, the
most true tragedy.’ Strained also is Burnyeat’s suggestion that ‘Our
author will do his best to give us a tragic plot of the kind Aristotle
approves, in which events are linked to one another by necessary or
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probable connections’ (p. ; cf. pp. –). For it is odd to sup-
pose an author so eager to follow Aristotle in this respect, and yet
so eager also to write ‘The Tragick Tale of Plato’s Adventures in
Sicilie’ (p. ’s proposed title for the Letter), in deﬁance of Aris-
totle’s warnings about Theseids and Heracleids composed by poets
who imagine that a plot is properly uniﬁed, not by representing one
action (or adventure), but by representing incidents in the life of one
man (Poet. a–), and in deﬁance also of Aristotle’s observa-
tion that a tragedy is overloaded if it contains as many incidents as
an epic (Poet. b–). In fact, Burnyeat himself does not always
insist that the Seventh Letter is a tragedy. For he describes it, not
only in dramatic terms (e.g. p.  ‘let the curtain rise on’; p. 
‘Act I’; p.  ‘Enter Archytas’) but also in terms more redolent of
the cinema (p.  ‘Flash forward to’) and of chapter headings in
vintage novels (p.  ‘The birth of our hero’). Hence it seems that
the important thing for Burnyeat is not so much that the Seventh
Letter be a tragedy as opposed to some other kind of storytelling,
but that it be storytelling as opposed to history. It is ‘a work of ima-
ginative literature’ by ‘a distinctive, original, and interesting crea-
tive mind’ (p. ). Thus the claim on p.  that the conversation
at   –   is ‘stichomythia-like’ is less a comment on its
formal properties than a reminder that nothing like it need actually
have taken place.
Burnyeat substantiates his claim that the Seventh Letter is a liter-
ary confection by an extended literary analysis, which goes through
aspect after aspect of the letter, in each case displaying the literary
eﬀect achieved by that aspect’s being as it is. The aspects include
the large and structural, as when pp. – display the eﬀects of
leaving unexplained Plato’s motives for his ﬁrst visit to Sicily, and
of postponing the introduction of Archytas until late in the story.
The aspects also include the subtlest details, as in pp. – on the
suspense generated by the tense of εἶχεν at   , and in p. 
n.  on why we should accept the manuscripts’ ἔφαμεν at   ,
and reject the emendation ἐφάνημεν: ‘it piles on the pathos if Plato
feels that he must cooperate in maintaining appearances’.
Burnyeat turns to literary analysis only after inferring, from the
philosophical incompetence of its author, the conclusion that the
Seventh Letter ‘cannot be relied upon to oﬀer trustworthy evidence
either on Plato’s philosophical development or on the aims and ac-
tivities of the Academy’ (p. ). But Burnyeat’s literary analysis
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gives him another, and to my mind stronger, argument for the same
conclusion. The systematic accumulation of literary eﬀect after li-
terary eﬀect makes it hard to doubt that these eﬀects were con-
trived by an author whose aim was just such eﬀects. Such an author
would no doubt have been happy to incorporate facts into his nar-
rative when the facts suited his literary aims. But he could not have
achieved those aims so splendidly without a readiness to ignore, dis-
tort, or fabricate when—as is the way with facts—the facts were in-
convenient. We should, in other words, think of the Seventh Letter
rather as we do the anecdotes about Plato at the court of Dionysius
that we ﬁnd in S.E. PH .  and Lucian, Par. . Of course,
there are diﬀerences: the Seventh Letter is long, but the anecdotes
are short; the Seventh Letter is sad, but the anecdotes are funny.
There is, however, also a momentous similarity. When we appreci-
ate the anecdotes, we realize that each belongs to a genre whose aim
is not to tell the truth; and when we appreciate the Seventh Letter,
we realize that it too belongs to such a genre. The anecdotes are
jokes; the Seventh Letter is much more like a tragedy. But neither
anecdotes nor Letter even try to tell us much about the history of
Plato’s intellectual and political career.
If the Seventh Letter tells us little about Plato himself, might it
not nevertheless show us something about how people have under-
stood Plato? And will that not itself be of philosophical interest?
Perhaps. But if the Seventh Letter is in reality a work of imagina-
tive ﬁction, then it need be no more a contribution to philosophy
than it is to geometry. For consider how, at   –, the Seventh
Letter deﬁnes a circle as ‘that which is equally far from the edges
to the centre in every way’ (τό . . . ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἴσον
ἀπέχον πάντῃ). There is an obvious objection to this deﬁnition: no
ﬁgure can be at any distance from its edges. Burnyeat is kinder to
the deﬁnition than it deserves. He calls it ‘perfectly good (if clum-
sily expressed)’ and translates as ‘that which everywhere extends
an equal distance from its extremities to its centre’ (p. ). His
translation saves the deﬁnition from the obvious objection only by
giving ἀπέχω a meaning that is hard to document elsewhere. LSJ
s.v. ἀπέχω III.b do indeed say that it canmean ‘project, extend’, and
cite two passages for thismeaning: Arist.PA a andGA a.
The former passage has ἀπέχω in the sense of ‘stick out’; this might
be rendered ‘extend’, but not in any sense of ‘extend’ that would
help the Seventh Letter’s deﬁnition. The latter passage would have
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ἀπέχω in the sense of ‘stretch’; this might be rendered ‘extend’ in
just the sense of ‘extend’ that is used in Burnyeat’s translation, but
editors ﬁnd ἀπέχω with this meaning so odd that they often emend
to ἐπέχω instead. At all events, the Seventh Letter’s deﬁnition of a
circle is far inferior to the deﬁnition that occurs on the lips of Par-
menides at Parm.   –: ‘whatever has edges equally far from
the centre in every direction’ (τοῦτο οὗ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ
τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ). Why the contrast? Like the author of the
Parmenides, the author of the Seventh Letter intends to give the
impression of someone with some geometrical knowledge; but, un-
like the author of the Parmenides, the author of the Seventh Letter
is ignorant of geometry himself, and so is content to put together a
fewwords that will, to those equally ignorant, give the intended im-
pression.This passage from the SeventhLetter is as little part of the
history of geometrical thought as the representation of the geometer
Meton in Ar. Birds –. The interest of such passages is not
the geometry that they contain, for they contain none of note. Their
interest rather is as evidence for what smattering of which geomet-
rical ways of talking had percolated how far away from those who
talked like that in earnest.
So too, more or less, when the Seventh Letter talks philoso-
phically. Its author intends not so much to philosophize as to give
the impression of someone philosophizing. He is acquainted with
philosophizing in Plato’s way. Some of his acquaintance is prob-
ably indirect, from reading manuals and textbooks. At any rate, his
numbered list at   –  of ﬁve items that pertain to knowledge
smacks of the lists to which Platonism was sometimes reduced, as
for example in Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Plato (D.L. . –:
‘There are three forms of good things . . . There are ﬁve forms
of constitution . . . There are three forms of justice . . .’) and Al-
cinous’ Epitome of Platonic Teaching (Didask. . –: ‘The ﬁrst
way of thinking about God . . . The second way of thinking about
God . . . The third way of thinking about God . . .’). But whether
direct or indirect, his acquaintance with Plato enabled him to de-
velop a plausible patter. Take, for instance, his jargon at   –
 of τὸ ποιόν τι and τὸ τί. This marks perhaps the contrast between
qualities and things, or perhaps the contrast between accidents and
essences. The context at    provides the unhelpful clues that τὸ
τί is an equivalent for ‘that which is’ (τὸ ὄν), and that both τὸ ποιόν
τι and τὸ τί are members of ‘a pair of things that are’ (δυοῖν ὄντοιν).
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Even the accentuation of these phrases is uncertain: for instance,
should the former be τὸ ποιόν τι (‘the somehow something’) or τὸ
ποῖόν τι (‘the how-is-it?’)? and should τὸ τί be understood with τί
(‘the what-is-it?’) or with τι (‘the something’)? But whatever the
details, this jargon certainly looks at ﬁrst sight impressively and
authentically philosophical. It is therefore surprising to note, as
Burnyeat does on pp. –, that the jargon is without extant paral-
lel elsewhere. Our surprise shouldmake us respect the author of the
Seventh Letter, not indeed for any philosophical achievement, but
for the achievement of inventing something that sounds so plausibly
philosophical. And we therefore need not worry about the philoso-
phical content of the Seventh Letter, anymore than we worry about
the geometrical content of its deﬁnition of the circle.
Two parallels should serve to emphasize the point. One is
Faustus’ opening monologue in Christopher Marlowe’s The Tra-
gicall History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus. Faustus
twice garbles his Justinian, declares himself ‘ravish’d’ by Aris-
totle’s ‘sweet Analytics’ while quoting with approval a notorious
anti-Aristotelian, and is very sloppy about the diﬀerence between
immediate and ultimate ends, equating ‘ﬁnis logices’ with ‘logic’s
chiefest end’ and ‘summum bonum medicinae’ with ‘the end of
physic’. So we should simply acknowledge that in Faustus Mar-
lowe has represented for us a marvellously versatile and learned
scholar; we should not probe further into what his versatile and
learned scholarship actually amounts to. The other parallel to the
Plato of the Seventh Letter is the Socrates of Aristophanes’Clouds:
a magniﬁcently imaginative version of a magniﬁcent philosopher,
but not a version from which we should hope to learn philosophy.
Trinity College, Cambridge
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